Not reliable….

This document will summarize the case as it stands January 2018. The plan followed is:

1- April-July 2012: "London whale" myths and termination letter
2- August-October 2013: "settled" version and final mischaracterizations
3- July 2015: the FCA drops the case against me laconically
4- September 2015 to March 2017: my first communications to uncover the legend
5- 12th June 2017: the first postings on the website trigger something but what?
6- 21st July 2017: the DOJ fuels the ambiguity and drops its case
7- 8th August 2017: Dimon: "Bruno- my personal view- is not the guy to blame"
8- 20th August 2017: the SEC drops the case and clears the ambiguity about my reliability
9- September 2017: the memo on the profits made by the bank lifts the veil…
10- October 2017 till January 2018: the role of regulators is described in this one unique story of mine

1- April-July 2012: "London whale" myths and termination letter

April-July 2012: 2 seminal articles bring up my name and "the London Whale" altogether describing me as a "deep pocketed trader roiling the markets"…One is written by Stephanie Rhule for Bloomberg News. The other article is written by Greg Zuckerman for the Wall Street Journal (WSJ)…The tale would be instantly popular. Dimon confessed on May 10th 2012 that "positions were flawed, poorly monitored, poorly reviewed, poorly executed…." So many adverbs and adjectives….No documentation of the hedging function played by the "tranche book" of CIO…. It is clear in public opinion after so much hammering–right in early June 2012- that it was because of a "trader being off the charts" to paraphrase Warren Buffett…."we were misinformed" as per Dimon under oath before the US Congress in mid June 2012…..As of 12th July 2012, I am fired by the bank blaming me and searching the very maximum damage against me looking forward. The point here is only to highlight the backbone of the "marionette show" that had started in.

Here will be disclosed some extracts of this "strictly private and confidential" termination letter. There is a specific purpose to that. Back then in July 2012 it was "confidential" given that I still was under the confidential agreement coming with my job contract until October 2012. But there was nothing left "private" actually given the extensive statements of the bank on everything that related to my alleged job and my alleged "actions" at the bank. Almost nothing of what the bank would say would be right on these matters relating to my role and my actions. I remained silent in the public stage but I informed the authorities of the existence of documents that showed my actual role and alerts at CIO as early as August 2012. Initially the bank would be resisting in disclosing the documents. Once disclosed, the documents would clear 90% of the initial suspicions that had fueled the media reports so far on my name.

Since September 2012 and into the end of 2012 I was therefore under investigation as a "usual suspect" albeit not the "bad guy" any longer. The bank was under investigation too and had to run its ongoing businesses as best as possible. So the termination letter remained "confidential" in my mind still. The termination was abusive as the bank's own report on the scandal, the "Task Force Report" issued in January 2013, would start showing. Here the bank would contradict at least one of the accusations that it had used. The Task Force report indeed was listing the many alerts of mine that admittedly "may have prevented" the scandal to occur. Of course the bank would avoid disclosing the name of the author of these many "missed opportunities" as the bank would characterize it. It would

also avoid asking me whether I would agree to wave my anonymity rights. Thus I remained "anonymous" for the bank then in that very important part of the Task Force Report.

The US Senate Report in March 2013 would lift a little more the veil, but only a little more. The letter remained then "confidential" as the case was getting traction for the US authorities and the UK authorities. Then I did not want to impair their investigations. All the investigation teams could have a copy of this termination letter by June 2013. After October 2013, the US and UK authorities would have "settled" with the bank. But I had to keep the termination letter "confidential" if only not to pollute the official case that was apparently being deployed against Julien Grout and Javier Martin-Artajo. In July 2015 the FCA dropped its case against me but the SEC and DOJ cases were still pending. Status quo… Although only the SEC case was expected to proceed anyway due to the extradition issues met by the DOJ.

As of the 21st July 2017, the DOJ dropped its charges against my colleagues. A month later the SEC would do the same. Thus it is only now in late August 2017 that this letter bears nothing left "confidential". The "reliability" issue that was raised recently through the media called actually for more disclosure about this termination letter. It was said wrongly in a WSJ article that I had "changed my story", generating an unwarranted confusion between my knowledge of the facts and my testimony before the authorities. I refer the reader on "The morphing tales" that can be accessed on this website. And now I will comment the contents of this termination letter. This will solve the ambiguity and the confusion in part at least by clarifying the roles, what I knew then, and what I know now. To be clear, I did not change my "story" whether one thinks of my testimony as a witness for the US authorities and the UK authorities, OR one thinks of my public account of the events.

As to the bank itself, Dimon on August 8th 2017 wanted to be clear enough in his interview with CNBC: "WE MADE A MISTAKE AND CONFESSED IT RIGHT AWAY. BAD RISK AND BAD CONTROLS, ET CETERA. **IT'S IN THE PAST. I COULD CARE LESS ABOUT THE LONDON WHALE ISSUE, BUT I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT HERES -- HERE'S A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF NO CUSTOMER GOT HURT. IT WAS US. IT EMBARRASSED US. IT HURT OUR COMPANY. NO CUSTOMER GOT HURT AND WE FIXED THE PROBLEM."** The CEO and Board chairman of the time stated what this "London whale" scandal is for the bank in 2017 : "It's in the past. I could care less… it was us…we fixed the problem".

Here therefore are some extracts of this letter that was sent the 12th July 2012, 3 months after the "tempest in a teapot" episode and from a firm being equipped with a complete documentation on my job and my actions at the time.

a. The employer called me "Bruno"… Nothing personal… But the motives are accusatory and blameful as much as they can be.

Dear Bruno:

Subject: Termination of your employment

J.P. Morgan Limited (the ***Company***) hereby terminates your employment with immediate effect.

The termination of your employment relates to your management of and responsibilities in respect of the CIO's Synthetic Credit Book (the ***Book***). The grounds for termination are that you have committed serious misconduct which may amount to gross misconduct justifying the termination of your employment by the Company with immediate effect, as follows:

As Dimon would state but on the 8th of August 2017 only in an interview that he gave to CNBC, "***DIMON****: FIRST OF ALL, BRUNO –* ***MY PERSONAL VIEW -- IS NOT THE GUY TO BLAME****. OKAY, THAT HE WAS DOING WHAT HE WAS* ***ASKED*** *TO DO. IT GOT TOO BIG AND OUT OF CONTROL. HE WANTED --* ***FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND, SUPPOSEDLY HE WANTED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT****.* ***AND COMPANIES MAKE MISTAKES, OKAY??"***

In red and bold are the statements that are wrong. No, I was not "asked" to do things. I was ordered to execute them and if I did not comply fast I was fired. If I discussed these orders in a manner that would be judged irrelevant I would be fired as well. If I commented outside of the meetings, even within CIO, these orders in manner that would be judged irrelevant, I would be fired as well…Thus the word "Asked" is wrong as Mr Dimon knows quite well. I had to execute what anyone would call "orders". Yet I alerted on the dangers conveyed by these "orders". And I was not fired…yet.

Allegedly here I "wanted to do something about it". I was not the guy to blame. That is a vast understatement as such. All the authorities with no exception recognized this "situation" of mine at least in September 2012 already. The bank would be slow in admitting that however. 5 years and counting still…The bank had resisted initially in August 2012 disclosing confidentially the evidence proving that indeed "I wanted to do something about it". In fact I achieved a lot about "it". This is one key reason why most regulators struggled to support any charge against me early on through their investigation process. Yet some would try real hard for 5 years using dishonest means on the way….Having said that, whatever I would do in 2010-2011-2012 then, that could never be "enough" to stop "it"…By "It" I allude to the "priority No1" that Mr Dimon had set for this book of CIO since 2010 actually: "Kill it!". There was a well thought-of plan here involving closely regulators all along. This is what will be explained in the "JPM gains in 2012" and "VaR History". This is described through the lens of the current standards and regulation of the times in "The morphing tales" on this website too. And there was a conspicuous thread showing through all these documents: I was kept away from the decision-making loop year after year.

Thus Dimon would not be alone in understanding that indeed "presumably" I wanted to do something about "IT"…I did alert significantly so. I would shake the tree all along the hierarchy at CIO visibly so from my seat. But I would be overridden all along and left in the blind as much as possible by all my management line…. companies make mistakes… Here Jp Morgan was not alone making "mistakes"

b. Mischaracterization of the chain of instructions, of the respective roles, and of the valuation process in force at CIO

During March and April 2012, when the Book began to show significant losses, you received or were aware of instructions from Javier Martin-Artajo (i) to show modest daily losses in the marking of the Book rather than marking the Book in a manner consistent with the standard policies and procedures of JP Morgan Chase & Co (together with its subsidiaries, the ***Firm***) and/or (ii) to provide daily profit and loss reports that would show a long-term trend in the value of the Book's positions that did not necessarily reflect the exit price for those positions under the Firm's standard policies and procedures. You complied with, or permitted the compliance by Julien Grout with, such instructions in whole or in part with the result that there was a significant divergence between values under the Firm's standard policies and procedures and the Book's stated value; and/or

It would be probably very useful to secure the real background of CIO by reading "The morphing tales" on the matter above. To be sure, what the firm describes above is the very valuation process that the firm itself via risk management staff had ORDERED CIO London Front Office staff to run daily since late 2006 specifically for this "tranche book" of CIO from London front-office desks. The rationale had been closely monitored by the SEC and other as early as 2007. Yes the bank did require the "CIO London estimate P&L" process "*(i) to show modest daily losses in the marking of the book rather than marking the book in a manner consistent with the standard policies and procedures of JpMorgan*". Proofs: the CIO estimate P&L breached the standard policies in plain light with a clear mandate here for the firm. It had NO closing time, did NOT target "mid prices" and even less "exit prices". And it NEVER used consensus prices. These are 3 major known wanted breaches from the procedures and policies that were in force at JpMorgan since 2007 at least. All those breaches of CIO for this "tranche book" were done on purpose. Of course they were NOT done in a *"manner consistent with the standard policies"*. This goal pursued by the bank since 2007 is pictured in the point (ii) in fact. It would be discussed between me, Artajo, Macris and Hugues at VCG then, ie in 2007 and onwards. "Yes" again the bank did require forcefully since April 2007 to "*(ii) provide daily profit and loss reports that would show a long-term trend in the value of the book's position that did not necessarily reflect the exit price for those positions under the firm's standard policies and procedures*". The bank here had had a clearly stated objective: Dimon and the operating committee needed to "pilot the tanker" as Macris coined it in March 2007 and onwards. The drivers were FAS157, "hedge effectiveness", "two step valuation process". It matters to remind here that Hugues at VCG all along in 2012 applied tolerances without setting the corresponding reserve himself. He would comment once that these prices were set at the most aggressive bound in the bid-offers, highlighting the fact that they could not be considered to be "exit prices". He will be criticized officially for that but he will NOT be fired. He will be in the firm in mid 2013 still….He will not be charged either while he was an official "gate keeper". Obviously this "gate keeper" had done his job well enough, something which therefore proves –among many other things- that the price differences were well known no later than April 2nd 2012 for March month end 2012…

From late 2006 till March 2007, it was the senior management of Jp Morgan via the risk control firm-wide management that had designed progressively this quite unique exception at CIO for the "tranche book". That was deliberate, sensible and scrutinized despite the appearances. The letter closes stating on this invented "information gap" that it ended "*with the result that there was a significant divergence between values under the firm's standard policies and procedures and the Book's stated value*". Of course there was one "*significant"* divergence since the bank wanted to have competitive measures of performance for the "tanker" of JpMorgan, namely the "Book" in this letter.

The additional issue for JpMorgan here is that these differences would be **audited and flagged in late 2011 by internal auditors**. They would be audited again in every granular detail **and validated** in May 2012 BEFORE the 10-Q of Q1 2012. The audit would be done by the IB controller in chief Allistair Webster who knew as of May 1st 2012 why this price difference was here from me in person at least. He also learnt in detail by the 3rd May 2012 how this difference had appeared from me again at least. The same IB controller Webster before the 10-Q was released on May 10th 2012 had found independently the need of at least a $307 million adjustment. I had discussed with Webster few days before how to work out in his head the computation of such adjustment, if needed, using just a handful of prices. That was straight, intuitive and transparent. Yes CIO London staff job had been fully audited by Webster here. And here Webster had the internal auditors' report on avail that had been written in late 2011… The VCG-IB price controller Bessin had been in the loop too and had recommended by then a $2.5 billion additional adjustment for concentration risks present on this "tranche book". That is what Bessin had concluded adamantly BEFORE the 10-Q for Q1 2012 would be published.

The two points above would thus be made crystal clear, justified and explained in price terms. And the IB controller Webster still had no blame to issue against the CIO London staff. Webster just had a $307 million adjustment to recommend to the higher ups for the "tranche book" alone. The adjustment would NOT be done. Webster is found on the record thanking me on the phone for my "very helpful little tables" that explained everything in complete transparency. They had been instrumental in allowing Webster to work in his head with me what his adjustment might be. Not only did I explain in intuitive terms how the difference had persisted. But also I provided Webster with the tools to compute live in his head the adjustment required intuitively so. And he concurred with my analysis as far as I can tell.

Thus the "Human resource" executive of Jp Morgan re-writes history in a completely inaccurate manner in this termination letter that he had sent me.

I testified towards the FCA, the CFTC, the SEC, the DOJ, the FBI exactly on the lines written above providing the authorities with factual references to specific events that dated back from October 2006 on that matter of valuation. The investigations teams would listen, hear and deem my testimony truthful all along. This is why this extract here is quite useful to start seeing the backbone of the scandal. There was a genuine mismarking that would be hidden behind a fake one. The fake would be manufactured starting in early April 2012 AFTER Hugues had elevated the price differences in full.

The employer JpMorgan knows all these facts and evidence even better since late June 2012 through Cavanagh's Task Force team and Stephanie Avakian WilmerHales's team. A lot of documents of 2012 prove these affirmations above -as stated in the termination letter- to be completely wrong.

To sum it up the employer Jp Morgan accuses me of having "let" Artajo order Grout to minimize the loss. This also is plain wrong. Grout and I worked for Artajo in parallel each one having a separate role against what the org-chart of Jp Morgan had been suggesting for 4 months before the articles would come to press…

A little more explaining is needed at this stage…As said I testified towards ALL the authorities all along that we had been instructed back in late 2006 to deviate not only from 'exit prices' but also from 'mid prices' if needed to pick more aggressive but "sensible" prices. Everyone had a well defined role in this subjective process that the bank ordered to have on this "tranche book of CIO". The aim precisely was to show a "trend" devoid of the current market noise or devoid of temporary manipulations. It was all about for Dimon to be able to "pilot the tanker" as Macris had put it then. Now, regarding the facts raised specifically by this termination letter, I told Grout to Inform Artajo on

the losses. Whether he did or not is irrelevant since I did it myself (see evidence dated March 15th 2012 and March 16th 2012)…. And Artajo informed Macris and Drew and Pinto (JP Morgan UK CEO and head of Investment Bank trading) as per the emails of March 23rd 2012 and phone call of March 23rd 2012--- I explained in detail why and how those differences should have existed to the IB controller Allistair Webster in early May 2012 BEFORE the 10-Q report and Webster validation memo were finalized (see my own "small table" and phone calls with Webster from 2nd May to 6th May 2012).

c. "who" ordered those "massive trades" and "who" tried to oppose "it"

Under your responsibility for management and implementation, the Book experienced substantial, unexpected losses, after a dramatic increase in size, complexity and exposure to various risks and pursuant to a strategy that was not adequately vetted and that was executed poorly and without sufficient examination of underlying positions; and/or

All this strategy deployed at CIO was fully vetted inside the bank as it will be shown in the memorandum describing the fortune that the bank made through the scandal ("JPM gains in 2012"). Now the bank Jp Morgan here blames me for having done trades, under my "responsibility for management and implementation" that led to the huge loss on the "SCP". And the bank blames me in relation to "size", "complexity", "executed poorly" etc…. Every word counts here especially the "under your responsibility for management and implementation". This is a **Wrong statement:** I was completely overridden by no less than Artajo, Macris AND Drew altogether all along….The evidence abounds on the matter. My alerts had gone all the way up in CIO and had resulted in meetings with Drew in person. Drew, Macris and Artajo would maintain all their initial orders after those meetings. Risk management attended to all the meetings, heard all my alerts and still backed CIO's management. I was therefore ALSO overridden by risk management at CIO all the way up. More I had ALSO warned the CFO of CIO who attended the meetings and he therefore ALSO would dismiss my alerts at the time backing both CIO management AND risk management.

These many executives met about this "Book" without me and next would feed me with instructions for immediate execution. That was the setup for this book since 2006 anyway. The choice of the words made by the bank is thus inaccurate given the context described above (see my slides in March 2011, my emails of early April 2011 to QR, my slides of June 2011, my emails of August 2011 to Macris and Drew, my trip to New York in September 2011 to alert in person NY based decision makers, my slides for the December 9th 2011 meeting, my phone call with CFO and Business management on December 15th 2011). See also Drew's email to Artajo (I am NOT even CCed) ordering to stop unwinding and "maximize P&L" as of 10th January 2012, my alert on January 18th 2012, my emails on January 30th 2012 to Macris and risk management, my slides for ISMG meetings of January 31st 2012, and February 7th 2012…. See also my emails, chats and calls to Artajo or Grout on March 6th, March 15th, March 15th, March 19th, March 20th, March 21st, March 23rd 2012

d. accuracy and impact of my many alerts on the management team at CIO

You improperly and/or with gross negligence failed to identify, raise or assess, in a timely manner and as reasonably expected, risks and/or concerns in relation to the Book with respect to risks material to the Firm or its business activities; and/or

And here the employer Jp Morgan blames me at least for not having followed the procedures in place at the bank to elevate the issues. I will also comment these alleged "failings" and "negligence". This is a **Wrong statement.** Not only my alerts were timely and accurate, following every existing procedure available to me, but they also had major consequences all the way up the chain. Indeed they induced a major demotion of Artajo, a major elevation "all the way up" of Drew herself, and a major change in the reporting of P&L and risk BEFORE the first articles went to press… More the consequences were happening with managers who were fully informed. Thus to comment on the sentence of Dimon here made on August 8th 2017, "he wanted to do something about it", I say that I made the maximum impact I could from my seat inside the firm. And that was heard well ahead of time. (see the "strategy 27" in 2011, see my New York trip of September 2011, see my slides for the December 9th 2011 meeting with Drew, see the "maximize P&L" email of Drew to Artajo dated January 10th 2012, see the anger of Drew on January 18th 2012, see the January 31st 2012,see the demotion of Artajo in early February 2012, see the "new York quick trip" of Artajo on February 8th to 9th 2012 as per express order of Macris, see the March 1st 2012 email of Macris to Artajo, see the phone call of March 20th 2012 between Artajo and myself, see the march 23rd 2012 elevation of Macris, Drew and Artajo, see the March 28th email between Stephan and Macris about my suggestions to monitor the losses (these changes will be endorsed in full by the bank in July 2012 as 'the thing they should have done long ago to monitor this book'—they were actually MY suggestions exposed back in late 2011 and already made available to Stephan and Kalimtgis inside CIO as per the 28th March 2012), see the Task Force Report itself of January 2013 about the "opportunities missed"…

e. The other heavily worded blames and accusations that followed…

They were just generic, unspecific and quite aggressive unsubstantiated criticisms of "my actions". They were just all going against the facts and evidence that the employer had under the eyes when it wrote this termination letter. ….One may sum it up as the employer blamed me for having acted in a way that was detrimental to the shareholders and to the reputation of the bank causing multiple 'failure', 'violations' of the firm's policies and procedures in place. That led to 'injurious', or 'inappropriate', or 'unsatisfactory', or 'detrimental" effects to the firm 'causing material financial or/and reputational harm to the firm'….This is a **WRONG wording**: see my own analysis of the time, see the timely projections of losses ahead of time.

In a broader perspective see my complete transparence and integrity towards my colleagues and my management, see my complete cooperation and truthfulness towards all the investigation teams involved….

See also the references above: not only my alerts were heard, they were accurate and timely but they also were raised to the top of the firm properly so. They all had a major impact but still led to orders coming back from the top that ALONE caused the scandal.

After this termination letter, I was clawed back 2 full years, ie the maximum for that and put under potentially infinite fines as I was straightaway suspected by SEC, DOJ, FCA, CFTC, the Serious Fraud Office in the UK. As estimated then I could face up to 7 years in prison in the US and more years of prison in the UK could come on top of that as it was feared then from a pure legal standpoint.

It was "possible"… The bank was very well aware of that when it wrote this termination letter. Of course it was likely that I would be barred forever from resuming working in the financial industry……Add to that the fact that a major scandal was placated on my name for the rest of my life and I was sure to never find a decent job in the future anywhere.

This went far beyond "blame" or "maximum economic damage". If only just one among all the blames and accusations of the Bank, led by Mr Dimon, had proved to be true…..None was and the bank knew it in July 2012 from within using external pairs of eyes. The "personal view" of Dimon actually mattered very little. It was not about "blame" anyway here. The Task Force investigation of Cavanagh and the "second look" of Stephanie Avakian's team working then at Whilmerhale (defending the firm on the case then) in Late June 2012 had already gathered enough evidence here for anybody at JpMorgan in early July 2012 to be aware of what I can claim only today in 2017. By September 2012 all the regulators involved had the evidence too and he US Senate commission as well.

The bank should have exposed its blames to me before actually firing me. Also the bank should have offered me a chance to answer those very serious accusations issued against me in an interview where I could have had a chance to refute them all on the record. The bank accused but just never respected the UK job law in that respect. I was based in London, at the City, though. Not a single regulator involved would try to correct this ever in the future.

Among the blames issued by the bank to "document" my termination letter, which one was just close to be about right? Just none and the evidence do exist to prove it as listed above. Was the bank aware that it was manufacturing a false document with this termination letter? Yes. The evidence again is a group of emails, phone calls and presentations that would be made available to any investigation team starting in September 2012 despite a strong initial resistance from the bank. All the regulators and the US senators will have access to those documents then…. As said the documents showed that I did NOT try to make money, I did NOT try to promote my career, I did NOT hide anything, I DID elevate all the way up the dangers that would materialize through the scandal WAY BEFORE the problems would have surged. Thus all the authorities were delivered in September 2012 with the documents that proved that this "London whale" was just a manipulation of the media and a manipulation of the financial markets using "me" as a decoy.

2- August-October 2013: consensual version and final mischaracterizations

August –September –October 2013: the nickname "London Whale" had remained stuck on my name while the US Authorities disclosed their charges and the cooperation agreements that they had signed with me. Despite the information made available since September 2012, not a single authority had made the clear in full on the manipulation that had occurred either in the media or in the markets or through this termination letter. My "role" and my "actions" would remain vastly distorted. The FBI for example listed me as a "co-conspirator" as if I had indeed conspired with my colleagues that were being charged. It really sounded like "He was guilty but he had escaped the charges by throwing his former colleagues under the bus". My cooperation agreement looked rather like a dirty "collaboration" act on my end where I would say what the US authorities wanted to hear to secure the indictments that they were looking for. This supposition alone sheds a pretty bad image about the integrity of the US authorities themselves. And one wonders whether the FBI really had no other choice in its characterization of me. It looked like they were all "losers" ahead of time.

The investigations remained OPEN still about Drew, Macris, Dimon and his lieutenants then. I had signed a cooperation agreement in June 2013, AFTER having met already with the US authorities in

April 2013. **My testimony of April 2013 was judged truthful and therefore 100% reliable. I was a "knowledgeable" person. My testimony would NOT change in the future. Only the questions would change and the corresponding answers to these questions of course.** This cooperation agreement thus concerned the case as a whole, including Grout and Artajo of course, but including ALSO Drew and Dimon at least then. Thus it is plain wrong to state in 2017 so summarily that I had agreed to "testify against my colleagues". To be sure, I do not know what the US authorities' case was. I knew only what they had publicly disclosed. And when I saw the vast amount of misrepresentations that they had conveyed in August and September 2013, I was more than puzzled…See "the morphing tales" on this website for details about the misrepresentations that had been conveyed then… I had agreed to cooperate on the whole case related to the "events that had occurred at CIO between 2011 and May 2012". I was a committed witness and hopeful then that these were just "tactics". There was an objective proof of that. Remember that in August 2013 the DOJ stated that the investigation remained open. The charges would not stop at Artajo in the hierarchy in principle. That was also the understanding of Carl Levin in September 2013 AFTER the "settlement" was made public.

The case was indeed covering many more people than Grout and Artajo alone. As Bhararat (DOJ) would state in august 2013: "the investigations remain open" ….It was stated by the way that they- Grout and Artajo- had acted to "please the management". Thus the "co-conspirators" logically were to be found up to the very top of Jp Morgan even if they were not named yet. But it would not be clarified further. In this "storm of misconduct" that pervaded throughout all the ranks at Jp Morgan, to paraphrase Bhararat, I stood out as a "voice of reason" who had pulled the alarm bell more than once.

More ambiguous statements would reinforce the doubt though….

How sensible was it to state in August 2013 so ambiguously on the part of the DOJ that one may not say that I would be "exempt of reproach"? I would just NEVER have to discuss any failure of mine with the US authorities that I had NOT already elevated to my management at the time of the events. As all the investigating bodies could see with their staff, I had acted as an open book and my "errors" had been quite benign. They were so benign that even the bank would not dare list them among the causes for my termination. By the way, those errors confessed by me in writing at the time were quite spontaneously elevated by me.

That ambiguous sentence of Bhararat therefore just made no sense as well except that it created ALSO a lasting doubt on my integrity….Like the FBI did in fact

3- July 2015: the FCA drops the case against me laconically

July 2015: the FCA dropped its intent to charge me in priority among the "traders" involved. The FCA had run its investigation trying to make me be the sole man responsible for the scandal at Jp Morgan. That must be a coincidence while the FBI and the DOJ had just slipped such ambiguities in 2013…. For that the UK regulators would manufacture what can be defined as "false documents". To understand what "false documents" means here, one has to go the website definition of "false statements" provided by the Merriam Webster dictionary: "

Legal Definition of false statement: a statement that is ***known or believed by its maker to be incorrect*** *or untrue and is made especially with intent to deceive or mislead* " (https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/false%20statement).

The FCA slipped "false statements" by distorting existing original documents through the translation or the mere transcription process that accompanied its investigation. This generation of "false statements" was created within the original evidence and led to "false documents". Those "false documents" were misleading the reader in a well defined way. They were not sort of mistakes made at random as I will explain here.

In July 2012 I had accepted the idea that the FCA had committed to make me fall on the grounds that they wanted to make "an example". I did not know what I had done wrong in the eyes of the FCA staff. I had never met them. Since I could disprove easily all the blames and accusations of the bank as they had been issued in its termination letter, I waited for the FCA case to materialize. Maybe the FCA had more to say…The FCA would send me in August 2012 its starting point that led the UK regulator to prepare charges against me. The FCA letter betrayed a deep misconception of my role and actions. The FCA letter echoed the terms of the termination letter: same misrepresentations, same blames, same accusations but worded differently though. I was not sure I read it correctly. Maybe they at the FCA had a subtlety hidden behind….The FCA was wrong on its premises for sure. But the FCA could prevail against me given the highly personalized context where the FCA would just have to try to convince a profane Jury. I would have to overcome the "benefit of the doubt" that was granted to the FCA anyway. Had the FCA been successful in its commitment, at least I would know what this was all about.

The FCA did something much worse than that subjective pre-defined commitment where it was sure to win in the end actually. A serious investigation into the FCA investigation itself should be done on the matter. By "serious", I mean here a real one done by really independent bodies in the UK, which excludes the FCA itself and the Complaints commissioner for sure. A lot is to be uncovered….

Thus the FCA produced misleading call extracts for example. One call (between Grout and I on March 15th 2012) had been wrongly translated from French to English bearing an expression like 'to keep to our system' that was completely at odds with the context of the call. This is how the sentence stood out at once, ie as a weird one even before listening to the call itself. Yet that sentence alone- taken out of context as the FCA tried it- conveyed quite a suggestive and helpful wording for the goals pursued by the FCA on its case against me. One may speculate endlessly as to where the FCA had picked this weird expression. The fact is that the call record was impaired right when the FCA overrode it with "to keep to our system". One can clearly hear a "EuroStar" (the high speed train that connected Paris to London) speaker covering massively the chat that I had with Julien Grout right at this moment. The FCA in any event could not be assertive had it been just "fair".

When faced with this "false document" in July 2013, confronted upfront by the FCA on this sentence as a "starter", I would simply reject those words in full during my interview (on the record). I volunteered to say that there was a problem with the transcript here. I was assertive. The record of the interview does exist and is crystal clear. I would describe these words as nonsensical and would provide my own explanation of this call. I simply read or commented aloud the other parts that fully provided the context and contents of the call. There was nothing of a "to keep to our system" (if the expression ever had a sense) but just a well described care to keep a sensible balance among the surrounding uncertainties and consistently with the current instructions. All was said explicitly in the call, ie not at all implicitly. This fact alone dismissed the possibility that such a vague expression could be used. The FCA could simply NOT object anything against my own explanation since it was perfectly consistent with facts and corroborated by other evidence that the FCA had. The FCA would give up after a while as it seemed. All was crystal clear as the FCA would recognize in the interview.

Still the FCA would allege in February 2015 through its PIR, without ever trying to discuss the matter with me again in the meantime (18 months had passed!), that I "could not remember" the meaning of those words "to keep to our system". One may argue that it could simply be a misunderstanding caused by a poor soundtrack. Fair enough for the March 15th 2012 call record….But that was clearly unfair on the part of the FCA given the clarity of the interview of July 2013….Why then would the FCA be so adamant and obsessed with what fairly so was unreliable?

Another call, in English this time between Artajo and myself on March 23rd 2012, did not need any translation and was actually crystal clear on the tape. As other documents available to the FCA showed, I had just learnt from Grout of an order issued by Artajo to Grout that indicated that Artajo aimed to keep increasing the IG9 10yr position. That would surely be done without my involvement. Both Grout and Artajo knew then with certainty (as the evidence showed) that I would stand against such an idea whatever the rationale was. As any outside observer would expect reading the documents of the time, Artajo had told me nothing of that order but had instructed Grout. Grout inadvertently had informed me. And I had called Artajo in return to tell him that such an idea was "not possible". Thus I did on the record clearly tell Artajo "He (Grout) told me that". That sentence killed the "London whale" myth whereby I had been the sponsor of those IG9 10 year trades. This myth is still entertained today in 2017. But back in July 2013 the FCA by means of this transcription twist -that no one can hear like this on the tape this time- made me say to Artajo "I told him that". This changed fully the picture and fueled the myth full steam instead… As per the FCA tweaked "version", I looked like the one giving orders to Grout and the one "informing Artajo" of this order of mine of course that consisted in growing further the IG9 10yr position. In truth, the FCA could NOT have missed that "mistake", in July 2013 at the latest. The call was in English and the soundtrack was very good. I was the one calling Artajo to OPPOSE such a move on the IG9 10yr. Here the real call having a crystal clear record- with a proper transcription- proved that I was doing much MORE than "doing what I was **told** to do" (I paraphrase Dimon in August 2017 here with a more appropriate word than "asked"). As mentioned before, I was "ordered", no "asked" to do things. Otherwise I was left in the blind…And in that particular example I had been dedicated by Artajo to work on other things than trading for the book. I therefore did step out of the way that had been just ordered to me by CIO management.

Yet I "wanted to do something about it", and I "did something about it". Artajo actually gave up fast on this idea to grow further the IG9 10yr. This evidence alone goes straight against what Dimon would pretend again in August 2017 still. Was it "presumable" that I wanted to do "something about it" or is it crystal clear that I was "weighing AGAINST IT" as much as I could, provided I was told inadvertently of things that my management undertook in a secretive manner towards me then … I was stepping out of my way, out of the "orders" that I was to comply with anyway. I had just been sidelined by my boss but I came back in the loop a bit by chance…. It was NOT the first time I had stepped out of my way and NOT the last time (see the April 10th 2012 weird events or the interactions with Webster in early May 2012)….

And here Artajo clearly was the boss who did NOT expect Grout to have informed me before the trades would be done. As this call shows, Artajo really had not expected a call from me about his latest trading orders here. He had NOT suspected that Grout would tell me as one has to clearly hear on the tape. In the real life Artajo would backtrack in front of my arguments. Still he was the boss of Grout and my boss altogether.

One may argue that I list just "2" cases. One may point out that, "Granted" the FCA played with the records in "not so good faith" at times. But that may have been just a little more than opportunism in the context of a very strong commitment to have me fall. "Bad judgment initially-Sorry!"…. At the

end of the day the FCA gave up, right? So I should not complain based on those 2 examples. Companies make mistakes, and regulators make the same mistakes knowingly so too. Fair enough … One may say that these 2 "false documents" were just a coincidence that uncovered a bias that became unfair but just in few occasions….

These 2 tricky distortions of existing evidence did NOT come alone by far. These multiple "errors of human judgment" on the part of the FCA would be more than "2 only". They would spread throughout too many different stages of the investigation of the FCA. As mentioned before on this website on June 12th 2017, the FCA simply did NOT finish the job that it had designed for itself in questioning me. As explained on this website already, back in June 2017, there should have been at least a second compelled interview with me if only to finish scrutinizing the trading strategy, the interaction with Hugues of VCG and the interactions with the controller Webster. These were critical parts of the FCA case whereby there had been inappropriate trading, inappropriate valuations, market manipulations and ultimately a mismarking. These topics had been set by the FCA for itself. As it turned out through my unique FCA-interview of July 2013, The FCA here had its premises on the case radically wrong with regards to the trades and with regards to their valuation. Its thesis on the market manipulation looked amateurish at best. It was aware of all this through the course of my sole compelled interview in early July 2013. Here either I was untruthful, or the FCA was plain wrong. The FCA would not check with me any further on these crucial points in the future: "trading strategy", "price control", "internal audit with Webster", "market manipulation".

It is a big "miss" on the part of the UK regulator, especially if the FCA truthfully believed that it had a case against me. For example, I was the "central trader" for the FCA and the regulator would only spend 10 minutes with me on the "trading strategy" matter. …. In those 10 minutes I had showed that I could prove that the trading strategy was the one of Drew. The FCA would move on avoiding further questions on that. But it still would consider me as the "central trader" in 2015. Similarly the clarity would not be made by the FCA on the actual accuracy of the mismarking thesis that the bank claimed. Still the FCA would persist in accusing me of having facilitated this mismarking without checking just once whether its statements were true with me. That is more than an occasional series of procedural mistakes here. This strategy of the FCA here would span over 3 years.

Another document was a "false document": it was the draft of my July 2013 compelled interview done by the FCA. The FCA had taken maximum care in preparing a recording of my compelled interview so that the tape would be of the very best possible soundtrack quality. And it was! One could almost hear the breathing of every person in the room while it would NOT interfere with the questions and answers being stated. Only the clicking noise of a cup of coffee on the plate would be a disturbance. Or inadvertent growls may cause the soundtrack to be impaired. This is a thing by the way that the FCA staff cared to remind us all along for us to pay attention to. Therefore there could be NO chance that the word "Liquid" could be mistaken with the word "il-liquid". There could be also NO chance that parts of the tape could be truncated through the transcription process as being deemed "inaudible". Some very few and short moments over the 7 hours and a half of recording were difficult to hear though but they could be cleared fast by listening twice. One should just listen to the tape of this compelled interview provided the document could be made "public" at last.

As explained already on this website, this "draft" based on a really high quality soundtrack contained 130 major transcription errors (of which unbelievable truncations about my actual rank in the firm and about the April 10th 2012 weird minimizations of the estimate P&L reported losses). The "errors" just ALL lined up to convey a misleading ie "consistently distorted version" of my testimony. Those 130 'errors' of transcription were based upon a clear tape however. They all did align in a well organized

way, not in a random coincidental one. There was no opportunism of any kind here. The tweaks were arranged according to a systematic plan. All those errors, almost one per page of the transcript, happened to be denying the very existence of the "5 facts, 5 realities, 3 dates" that are depicted in the "June 2016 project letter. PDF" document present on this website. There is really very little room left to chance when one sees the list of those errors. See the page 2 of the "June 2016 project letter" to get a summarized view of those key "5 facts, 5 realities and 3 dates".

By comparing this series of 130 "errors" to the "June 2016 project letter" document, one can discern the target "scenario" that stood behind all those "errors". To be sure about this "visible" pattern: the FCA series of "errors" was meant to make people believe that the trades were under my control, that the instruments were liquid and that I did not manage to alert the bank properly. Sounds familiar? This is the tale conveyed by the termination letter of the bank. There was thus no subtlety to be found on the part of the FCA, far from it… Absent these "errors" the tale did not hold water as the transcript showed across the 7 hours and a half of interview… Therefore the "ignore and pretend" strategy of the FCA conveyed quite surgical tactics for producing documents in its investigation process. There was no room left to chance here. That was no coincidence as well. The compelled interview through my real answers indeed dismantled the tale of the bank and the one of the FCA altogether. The "errors" had brought back just a semblance of credibility. Yes these 130 transcription errors distorted the facts, the evidence, the crystal clear record of the interview in a very well organized way. As a result they made the termination letter of the bank look "just credible" at best for a profane jury in a court of law.

If one wonders whether this series of 'errors' resulted from the use of flawed "transcription automated device", one is wrong. It took the FCA actually 4 human beings dedicated to the task of producing this "draft transcript" of my compelled interview of July 2013. These 4 pairs of human ears built this "draft transcript" during 4 weeks at least since the "draft" was delivered only around August 10th 2013 to me. Across the distortions that this "draft transcript" had created from the excellent soundtrack of the compelled interview, there were crucial elements that were already accessible in public documents already by March 2013. The crucial elements were again the 5 facts, 5 realities, and 3 dates.

One can easily believe that any outsider would trust the FCA account in the first place and would NEVER check whether the FCA report was accurate. The FCA would base its "Finale notice" with the bank on these "errors" that it had generated somehow through the control of 4 human pairs of ears during 4 weeks. It would take me a week or 2, alone to spot and highlight all these soundtrack errors back to the FCA, just for the compelled interview transcript. By the end of August 2013, the UK regulator will have the list of all these "errors" from me. But the FCA will suddenly become blind and deaf for 5 weeks. During this time the FCA shall publish its final notices with the bank in September and October 2013. Only 2 Weeks after its public statements the FCA shall recognize that all the "errors" were errors actually…That acknowledgement would remain confidential.

People have many other things to do but check public reports, all the more so when the documents are highly "technical" like the "final notice" of the FCA. But it is hard to believe that neither the FCA, nor the US authorities themselves could ignore for themselves the contents of the Jp morgan's Task Force report, or the contents of the US Senate Report, or the answers to their own questions. One would find out though that the FCA just did that with these '130 errors' along with its subsequent public statements on the "London whale" case. The fact is further confirmed in other FCA interviews run with Jason Hugues, Julien Grout, Achilles Macris, Javier Martin-Artajo, Allistair Webster. The latter interviews are just other evidence of this fact that the FCA had known for years before the events those "5 Facts, 5 realities, 3 dates". Thus the FCA conveyed in September-October 2013 public characterizations on the "London whale" case that the FCA knew were erroneous. The FCA had

known their erroneous nature way BEFORE the 'London Whale" scandal would have even emerged in the press. As the reality percolates through some interviews, the FCA did not even need the many "answers" it had sought from me to avoid making these 130 "errors".

As a result of this quite peculiar approach of the UK regulator against me the "PIR" (Preliminary Investigation Report) of February 2015 that the FCA is a compendium of the many "errors" of the FCA. It was all the more surprising as the FCA had recognized in late 2013 its "self made errors" with regards to the draft transcript of my compelled interview. Ironically the FCA itself will show quietly what the UK regulator actually did against me between, 2012 and now… The RDC committee, usually a "rubber stamp" body inside the FCA that is meant to check mostly the respect of Human Rights – ie the "form" and not the "merits" of an investigation- will disavow just all the charges conveyed by the PIR. Neither the RDC nor the FCA will care to inform the public as they should have (see the FSMA 2000).

Actually they keep the same approach in 2107. Indeed, against my explicit query on the matter, neither the RDC nor the FCA will care to provide me with any justification of their internal decision even AFTER the response to the complaint that I had sent against the FCA. That goes against their official charter to respect the people they have "targeted". The complaint I filed against the FCA in 2015 is NO reason for them to still deny me the right in 2017 for me to access the information that the FCA used against me for so many years.

I had indeed filed in early August 2015 a complaint against the FCA that I had first to address to the FCA "complaints team". In this system of human rights protection in the UK, as far as I understand it today, the victim has first to complain first to the ones that presumably persecuted the victim in question.

The complaint against the FCA should have been dismissed quite fast by the FCA in that case, right? The FCA will take 18 more months. Based on a quite superficial analysis "in hindsight" the UK regulator would claim that these were benign errors that may occur in high profile cases like this one. If anyone has any hope that the office of the complaints commissioner would do anything on the matter, everyone should be sure: they would do strictly nothing but overall supporting the FCA "version". The complaints commissioner would not "see" even the obvious….

For example I had filed a complaint to the "complaints commissioner" in September 2015 since the FCA pretended to deny that my name was mechanically associated with whatever was published on the matter called "London Whale". Yes, the FCA was not sure that my name and the "London whale" name were mechanically associated especially when a watchdog was disclosing its "settlement" with the biggest US bank on the matter. That is new isn't it? The media should certainly take note of this. Is that wrong? Well, the "complaints commissioner" would concur with the FCA. The "complaints commissioner" would also NEVER judge that it was relevant to talk to me or even ask any question by email on any matter relevant to my complaint…..

It remains that the FCA investigation team was empowered with a "maximum credible deterrence" policy at the time in 2012. More it had almost no burden of proof to overcome in courts to show that I "may" have lacked integrity at one point in time. As explained, it did use "false documents" all along. It met with me only once not even finishing its own questioning on crucial matters. The FCA was almost sure to win as explained before. On balance, I would have had to show ultimately that the FCA had been wrong "beyond a reasonable doubt" in order to escape fines and penalties in courts of appeal. It therefore was enough for the FCA to show, "beyond a reasonable doubt" that "I could have done better", be that with "false documents", or be that on a quite incomplete investigation on me. There

never would be any possible "cooperation" agreement with the FCA. How could the FCA lose then? Answer: if the case went to an appeal court, I could speak up on the public stage one day. This is most likely what stopped the FCA. The UK regulator knew that the whole setup would surface then along with the subsequent abuses of the FCA….I would be considered as a "scapegoat" of the FCA at the end of day. And here there was no need to be an expert on the case.

There had been the interview of July 2013 with me that disproved straight the long prepared targeted thesis of the FCA. The FCA was unsettled as the July 4th 2013 interview transcript shows. The ensuing interview on July 9th 2013 with Grout would only confirm the deadlock in which the FCA had placed itself in then already. Still the FCA would reach this "settlement" in late 2013 that conveyed huge misrepresentations based on acknowledged "errors". As explained in this website already, the FCA had simply NOT fulfilled its job. The FCA had avoided talking about the control made by Allistair Webster, avoided looking deep into "who" had ordered the trades, avoided looking deep into what the price controller Jason Hugues was expected to do, avoided looking into the market data evidence about the market manipulation that did happen…The FCA statements would entertain the ambiguity about my integrity even in July 2015. They would be as quiet and ambiguous as possible….

It remains that, despite the false documents produced by the FCA, despite the constant " official targeting" by the FCA on my person since July 2012 only, despite the violations of human rights that the FCA recognized so quietly between 2013 and 2015 through the RDC decision, despite the superficial "apologies" of the FCA after the complaint in 2017, despite the "sympathy" of the complaints commissioner soon after, despite the extremely low burden of proof that the FCA had to overcome, at the end of the day there was just NO charge and only abuses of power against the target namely me.

4- September 2015 to March 2017: my first communications to uncover the legend

The US authorities could not tell me no to do "that", ie speaking up to the press….That was very risky. I was clearly informed in 2015 that if I spoke up, I could face up to no less than millions of fines and years of prison irrespective of the events of 2012…. Thus in pure financial terms, I just COULD NOT speak up to the press. More, the US authorities could either consider that my statements were "untruthful" in that they simply may "impair" their own case. The US authorities alone could judge on that and I might end up in jail for something that some people would like to hear as "justice contempt" or "obstruction". Cherry on the cake, I might ultimately be accused back again on the counts that the bank Jp morgan of Jamie Dimon first alleged back in 2012, irrespective of the evidence, but as displayed in the termination letter.

So was the risk. They all wanted a head to cut, mine if they could as "the morphing tales" describes. If I spoke to the press, they would have it most likley. They had carefully entertained the doubt on my integrity on the public stage in the first place. They may all go after me on the grounds that I finally had made obstruction to the running investigations BECAUSE I was guilty even though they themselves had no other evidence of that….

That would be perverse but here they were almost sure to win in front of a jury given the stigma that was planted on my name already. Remember all the ambiguous sentences combining with a very smart use of the "confidential" stamp…Who would believe a "cooperator" who was French, who was a "trader", and who was held responsible for a $6 billion trading infamous loss? Who was not fantasizing about harpooning the "London Whale" at last? That hope certainly crossed the minds of

some journalists like Mr Zuckerman or others. The suspicions were here to stay as the last events of 2017 show. The stakes were just as big as one could imagine for me if I started speaking up….

Yet I will send a statement to the French press in September 2015 asserting that I was following orders about the trades that had been done. I wrote that I had raised my disagreement all the way up then. I had been cleared by the investigating authorities be that in the UK or in the US. This nickname was defaming and I did NOT want to be called like this.

The French press stopped the association on my name, but the US and UK media kept doing the association. The stigma would remain anyway as Mr Dimon and regulators had wanted it to be for as long as possible. In November 2015 the UK press agency Reuters received a similar message. They stopped making a clear association but still played on words. In December 2015, the US press launched a couple of articles through a couple of high audience financial outlets like Bloomberg. I wrote a letter to the bank in January 2016 that is available on this website to complain about this quite unfair treatment made both by my former employer and by the media. The bank opted to do "NOTHING".

Thus I sent a 4 page letter in late February 2016 to the main press agency and few newspapers (DOW JONES, Bloomberg, REUTERS, Agence France Presse, Le Monde, Les Echos…). In this 4 page letter, I explained that I had opposed many times the instructions the best way I could. The top management would repeat its instructions in full knowledge of the issues at stake. This series of orders was part of a project that itself was as such a long thought plan that was engineered by Jamie Dimon for sure. It had started in a paradoxical fashion in March 2011, ie one full year before the scandal would erupt in the media. It revolved around RWA tentative measures as per basel III standards that were NOT even finalized and therefore NOT known for sure by anyone. The RWA "effort" was all based on share buybacks already announced by Dimon and allegedly characterized as "priority No1" by Drew then. One could infer that not a single detail had been missed in this long prepared plan that was strategic for the bank. I stated in January-February 2016 that I had ALWAYS acted in full integrity towards the bank and the markets….Given the risks that I was taking, I should simply not have done that communication either to the bank or to the media ….

Nothing happened on the part of the US authorities or the bank. The DOJ did not try to meet me again to question me on the events of 2012 while the last interview dated June 2013. Yet these 4 pages brought up a lot of key facts…3 years almost had passed.

Some journalists from Bloomberg, who had covered the "London whale" even before it had publicly started, seemed to believe, after reading the 4-pages letter, that I corroborated what the DOJ had stated in August 2013….Some parts were corroborating. Some others were not. "The morphing tales" on this website shows that the DOJ thesis was clearly different than my story. The elements of disagreement were not benign in this 4 pages letter of February 2016. Who had heard before of this share buyback plan of Dimon who had determined 100% the future trades that would cause the scandal? Who had been the "trader" then other than Dimon actually via Drew? Who had realized that Drew would mischaracterize the facts under oath during the US Senate hearings in March 2013? There had been no such "betrayal" against Drew with regards to either the trading strategy or the valuation changes. She had ordered them and supported them until she was "retired" in May 2012.

The consequences are huge on the theme "the investigation remains open". Why is that? Well that "wind down" plan of Dimon likely was the thread that explained in full why the US authorities believed that Grout and Artajo had acted to "please the management". And it was therefore one obvious reason why the investigations had to remain "open" in August 2013….Who had heard of the

potentially missing liquidity reserves in relation to this "tranche book" of CIO? That directly put into question AGAIN the accuracy of the 10-Q reports published for Q1 2012 AND Q2 2012 "in hindsight". That meant that Cavanagh was very involved and was thus very conflicted when he chaired the Task Force report publication in January 2013.

Thus it mattered to determine whether nobody would have heard of this "wind down" plan before in either the Jp Morgan's Task Force Report or in the US Senate report. Granted the US Senate commission made quiet hints both at the share buybacks and its direct connection to missing reserves related to Basel III standards. But these hints were stated in footnotes aside from the main official "story". Therefore, putting the emphasis like this on this long planned internal collapse and on the lack of liquidity, either I was plain wrong if any of the former public reports were to be trusted….Or I was right and all the public reports had misrepresented the facts. Thus the Bloomberg journalists were grossly wrong again in 2016 about the "London whale" scandal that they had launched with the WSJ in 2012. This also meant that the "London whale" media event as such may well have been a market manipulation on the part of those who had started it and fueled it thereafter. Thus this 4 pages letter was quite different from the August 2013 version of the FBI-DOJ-SEC. Yet it fully justified why Carl Levin would criticize the conspicuous absence of personal accountability among the top executives of the bank in late September 2013.

Aside from Bloomberg this letter of 4 pages will catch the attention of some other journalists though. The DOJ was NOT curious. There was no need to question me on the contents as a witness for the US authorities. I will meet several times however with the SEC between March and September 2016.

I will testify in New York in late September 2016 for 5 full days, ie about 6 months after these 4 pages had gone public. This testimony is fully CONSISTENT with the June and July 2013 testimonies of mine. While answering the questions under oath I also corroborated what I had communicated in early 2016 and what I would communicate in the future. Nothing had changed between 2013 and 2016 in the contents of my answers except the questions that were being asked themselves and the specific context of those questions. Indeed in 2013 the testimonies were screening the whole case whereby Grout and Artajo were suspected, but Drew and Dimon too were potentially on target. In 2016, the case was for the SEC to have Grout and Artajo condemned in courts, full stop. Still I was fully consistent on matters like "the Org-Chart being made by the bank in January 2012 was a misleading piece", like "the price differences stated in July 2012 were wrong", like "the orders sent since March 2011 to reduce the Basel III RWA were also a complete setup", like "the managers at the time were perfectly aware of what was going on ie a manipulation fueled through the IB from the very top of the bank", like "a $300 million worth of price difference existed already in December 2011 if not earlier", like "my colleagues had concealed facts from me at times in very specific moments"……

5- 12th June 2017: the first postings on the website trigger something but what?

In 2017 I would speak up more openly and the dangers would be still here for me to be sued by the bank and the authorities for the motives explained above. The good thing in the meantime was that I had made my SEC deposition through a full week. This amounted to 1500 pages of transcript, 40 hours of questioning and only few errors in the draft. To my great surprise I learnt in October 2016 that this testimony had been placed immediately under confidential seal. That was done against my will and without any consent of mine, once again. My expectations were deceived as this one deposition in theory should have been accessible to public by statute as I had been told initially many times. So in late 2016 I turned to the media more openly then for fear my deposition might remain

unknown forever. Then almost 5 years have gone in smoke and the truth was still not to be known publicly…. Only the former ambiguous statements remained. I had to "move on".

There is just NO reason today for this deposition to remain confidential like this. It is actually an unfair situation. Only the ambiguous statements of the bank, of the DOJ, of the FBI, of the FCA, of the CFTC remain on the forefront in the media.

Thus in January 2017 I spoke up further. But only little of what I know would be communicated: the case is too complex. More the Federal Reserve is involved. Why do they wake up so late and what for by the way? The Federal Reserve had been investigating the case since 2012. It had settled with the bank in late 2013. It had been criticized itself through the OIG report (October 2014). It had not tried to reach me all along. But in 2016 they had woken up for a reason that remains obscure today and will remain so. In early April 2017 they will give up and let the media know where they stand, not me…. So I start talking of the many manipulations that had occurred. I express my understanding especially through this website. The later statements went public the 12th June 2017. There would be again NO immediate feedback from the bank or the US authorities. There would be no request from the DOJ to question me again. Their last interview of me dated June 2013…

6- 21st July 2017: the DOJ entertains the ambiguity still and drops its case

As of the 21st July 2017, more than one month after the website went public the DOJ issues a statement. 4 years had passed…. The DOJ had not tried since July 2013 to hear me answering questions for their case. In July 2017 the DOJ dropped every charge against Julien Grout and Javier Martin-Artajo based on "recent writings and statements" of mine. Were these "recent writings and statements" "confidential" or publicly accessible? Years had passed indeed. The spontaneous answer would be "publicly accessible.

The DOJ mentioned at first the fact that anyway the 2 former employees could NOT be extradited, which means they could NOT be tried anyway unless they surrendered themselves to the US authorities. The DOJ staff next stated publicly that they had arrived at the "belief" that they could not "rely any longer on" my testimony in their case against Grout and Artajo….And, should they surrender to the US authorities, my "recent statements and writings" would have had a detrimental effect on the case that had been brought against them. The DOJ staff did not make specific references in the official statement. Thus no one knows what has triggered their decision for sure. Was it the 4 page letter of February 2016? Was it the SEC deposition of September 2016 now confidential? Was it the drafts of the book (November and December 2016)? Was it the articles of March April 2017? Was it the website (June 2017)? Was it the most recent articles of June-July 2017? There was just no specific reference to any public statement of mine... Could it be about my confidential testimony itself after all?

Here is the official statement of the DOJ for the sake of transparence and clarity in what follows:

"*Joon H. Kim, the Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, announced today that the Office has filed a proposed order to dismiss the outstanding charges against JAVIER MARTIN-ARTAJO and JULIEN GROUT, two former derivatives traders at JPMorgan Chase & Company ("JPMorgan"). MARTIN-ARTAJO and GROUT were indicted on September 16, 2013, for their alleged participation in a conspiracy to hide*

losses in a credit derivatives trading portfolio at JPMorgan. MARTIN-ARTAJO, a Spanish citizen, and GROUT, a French citizen, have not appeared on these criminal charges. On April 23, 2015, a court in Spain rejected the Government's request to extradite MARTIN-ARTAJO, and a prior determination had been made that attempts to extradite GROUT from France would have been futile. The motion to dismiss is subject to the approval of United States District Judge Lorna G. Schofield.

As set forth in the proposed order, the Government sought charges in this matter ***based in part on the Government's anticipated ability to call as a trial witness Bruno Iksil,*** *a former colleague of the two defendants at JPMorgan.* ***Based on a review of recent statements and writings made by Iksil, however, the Government no longer believes that it can rely on the testimony of Iksil in prosecuting this case, even if the defendants appeared****. Based on these developments, among other factors, the Government has decided not to keep these charges pending, but rather to seek their dismissal at this time."*

It matters to clarify the source of the ambiguity in the DOJ statement, funnily enough, that is based on what "to rely on" may mean. The web based Webster definition is : {https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rely}

"Definition of RELY

1. *:to be dependent : the system on which we* rely *for water*
2. *:to have confidence based on experience : someone you can* rely *on"*

In short "to rely on" may have a moral meaning or a practical meaning. One may not trust the testimony. Or one may very well consider the testimony as truthful, accurate but not "helpful" any longer to win the case. There are many layers here of ambiguity in fact as this definition of "to rely on" above shows. **First** it may have been that the DOJ was dependent upon my testimony and now could not depend any more on this testimony. How dependent was it given the millions of emails and documents and other testimonies that the DOJ, the FBI, the SEC have scrutinized since 2012? They always had much, much more information than I ever had. One would not know the answer quantitatively speaking given the complete absence of reference as to why, how or how much the DOJ depended upon my testimony. **Second** it may or may not also have been about "*to have confidence based on experience*" as well. Here irrespective of any absence or presence of reference, irrespective of the level of dependence, one needed at least to know whether this was a confidence lost based on "experience" of my testimony or based on past "experience" related to "how to win the case".

The ambiguity prevailed. The rumor will float of course that I was not any longer a reliable person. Was it because my testimony or deposition –made under oath- were inconsistent over time? Was it because my public statements contradicted my former testimonies? In either or both cases, the DOJ would likely have charged me or at least made statements on the matter, ie specific references… Silence prevails here.

Was it because even though there was no contradiction, nothing to charge me or blame me for, I conveyed a picture that made no sense and thus I conveyed one "unrealistic" version that would therefore hurt the case of the DOJ? In short this would mean that I had conveyed some "nonsense" in

some places that dismissed my testimony as such. This is quite a peculiar outcome given the self consistency that I have always had all along those years. More, it was easy for the DOJ to spot this inconsistency publicly so. Indeed, having much more information than me in that regard, it was quite natural to actually disprove what I have conveyed on the public stage if that had been wrong… Or at least explain it in some way…There is none of this.

Or was it because my testimony and my "recent writings and statements" on the public stage conveyed a consistent picture that secured almost surely a lost case for the DOJ as per a rational "review"? Here there was indeed no possibility to provide specific reference to a contradiction or invoke some inconsistency of mine be that from confidential or public sources….Silence should have prevailed logically so here about specifics…

Still there were here as many possible scenarios. But the ambiguity prevented the public from knowing with certainty which one was right.

It is sure at the time that, from July 2013 till July 2017, the DOJ people would NOT have tried to question me again and secure their understanding of my first testimonies of 2013 or of 2016. Yet, as listed above, I would have made quite a lot of "writings and statements" in the meantime and thereafter, both public and confidential. One thing is certain, given the very existence of this cooperation agreement: I had remained consistent.

Another certainty too is that the stigma had been planted there on my name in 2012 and entertained quite regularly since then. That ambiguity induced many people spontaneously to interpret with a bias this statement of the DOJ based on this salient absence of specifics. Many thought therefore either that I had "changed" my "story" or that my testimony was not "reliable" outright, ie not truthful, or both actually… One clue here is that, had this suspicion been founded that my testimony was "not reliable", the DOJ would have also stated then that it had torn up the cooperation agreement it had signed with me…. At least I would have been made aware of that. The DOJ just did NOT do that after 4 weeks of close scrutiny of the website and other former writings of mine that it knew of. Besides, given the public statement itself that was ambiguous, the DOJ would certainly NOT comment unduly on my testimony since it still WAS CONFIDENTIAL, right? As of January 14th 2018, my cooperation agreement with the DOJ on this case is still in place as far as I can tell while the case of Grout and Artajo WAS closed for sure almost 6 months ago…. So this suspicion may be tempting but it does not match the facts.

So, looking back at the range of possible scenarios, one is surely bound to question the consistency between my public statements and my confidential testimony… And this possible inconsistency is either "intrinsic" to my testimony and public statements taken altogether or it relates to the DOJ case itself. Who knows right? Maybe I am mad…. Or more likely maybe some public inferences of mine are nonsense at the end of the day because indeed I do not know everything… Nobody at the US authorities should avoid justifying the recent decisions. But on balance they could not comment freely so on confidential testimonies…Unless they have some grounds for that, something which would be disclosed publicly for sure. Yet they could comment on my public statements at their convenience. Here one is left with a "review" of my "recent statements and writings" full stop. Therefore it may simply be that there was no inconsistency on my part, public or confidential…. Thus the DOJ case simply turned out to be self-inconsistent….

12 Days after this ambiguous DOJ statement on my "reliability", the WSJ journal will publish an article alleging that "last year…." I had "changed my story" …. It took a while for the WSJ to publish its piece here…. This sentence, going against all logic, led the reader to further believe that the

testimony of me as a witness towards the authorities had changed while only the account of the events that I could reconstruct had evolved. To be sure this reconstruction is NOT what I am expected to provide as a witness to the US authorities. And I convey the very same version of mine on the public stage since late 2015….

Where was the original ambiguity of the DOJ statement showing exactly at the start as of July 21st 2017? It stood between what the US Authorities wanted to know that they would have asked me to answer confidentially for years now, and what I would say publicly to express my understanding of the events on this website or in my draft book for example. The DOJ statements may have well led people believe that my answers to the US authorities' same questions had changed. But the DOJ did not say such a thing, did it? As said, it would be a very wrong assessment even if the stigma that has been planted on my name in 2012 would suggest it so well.

The only thing that would change over time is my understanding of the events. And the things that had been so well concealed from me in 2012 and before about the "Book" would shape my future public account-there is only one version here-. My understanding will evolve indeed a lot between 2012 and 2015. So as far as my testimony as a witness for the US authorities is concerned, it did not move by an inch all these years. As to my public account it is the same since 2015. It just arrives in successive steps since then, one by one…

It matters to repeat again though: since my answers as a witness for the US authorities remained so forcefully CONFIDENTIAL, they should NOT have been commented freely even off the record by the DOJ and even less so by journalists. Thus here the DOJ statements likely pointed to my recent "statements and writings" that were NOT confidential, ie were NOT part of my testimony as a witness for the US authorities.

At this stage one should wonder why the WSJ could state that I had "changed my story" then. What did the WSJ journalist refer to in what they had understood from the DOJ? This use of the word "story" usually refers to what a "witness" is expected to say… But who knows…In any case, I disagree in full with what the WSJ article stated. This quite confidential "story" as a witness did not change by an inch in fact. The fact also is that I convey the very same version of mine to the public stage since 2015 anyway….I had not changed my story, "confidential" or "public".

In order to clear this confusion now that showed up 12 days after the DOJ ambiguous statement, it matters to show that the WSJ staff had a lot of information from me at its disposal. There was an email in particular that comes below as it was written. I will not correct here the many typos I had done in the original email- I will just put them in italic. This email originally was not intended to go to the WSJ journalists. It was just a spontaneous preliminary feedback to another journalist who had been immediately interested in the latest decision of the DOJ. It was just a "first shot" that I had not re-read before sending. I here just commented quickly on a topic of interest that this jounrnalist had conveyed to me in the first place. Thus I had provided written clues ahead of a call that I would have a bit later with this other journalist (I skipped the point "1" that I still deem confidential but that is of low importance today). That seemed "clear" as one will see. The typos were many. The style was clumsy. But the overall picture was straight: I had had a knowledge base from my job at CIO and I would discover critical things thereafter mostly in 2013 and 2015. The email shortly described how my understanding had evolved as I discovered things. This email would be sent to the WSJ with my full approval for the journalist to quote me at their sole convenience.

The WSJ staff had many reasons to reach out to me through the email address that I had created with this website… I made it clear that I would not talk to one of them. But they were all aware that my

website existed. And they were curious about my recent "writings and statements". Here on the website I stated that my testimony had not changed. I also explained how my understanding had greatly evolved and had led to this unique story of mine that showed on this website. I clarified here that my testimony and my public account were perfectly consistent. More what I described on the website clearly criticized the way the WSJ had covered the "London whale" scandal. My job and my actions and the related events of the time, I mean the real ones, had been ignored from the start of the legend. It would be a good opportunity for the WSJ to check the facts that I listed in this email below in the context of the website and the DOJ subsequent statement…

More the DOJ statement was surprising enough as such. I had been a cooperating witness since 2013. I had been interviewed twice by July 2013. I would communicate on the public stage many times, diverging publicly so from the official thesis since 2015… This divergence followed only one path. And yet NOTHING from the DOJ had come indicating the need to secure my "recent writings and statements" on the record…. And all of a sudden in July 2017, ie 4 years later and many communications from me in the meantime, the DOJ had not been so clear as to its "belief" on the "reliability" of a central witness for its case…..That was a puzzling outcome for sure that deserved a serious "facts check". The WSJ project clearly aimed to cover the DOJ statement and it had to check a couple of things with the DOJ, if only from this email of mine below that it will receive a couple of days before the 3rd August 2017.

Here is what the WSJ journalists had read from me that they could quote at will:

"**Just to set the context right about what I thought and think today about the potential guilt of Javier or Julien.....**

2- the DOJ stated on the right "order" *htat* the extradition was impossible so far, which means that the DOJ could NOT proceed with its case anyway. It certainly relied on my testimony to possibly bring new elements that may lift this extradition ban. But after reading my recent statements and writing, all coming from the testimony as it seems, the DOJ got the "belief" that they could not proceed with the case that was stalled by extradition already, relying on my future testimony for them. *thus* they did not say that my testimony was not reliable as such. This does not mean though that my SEC deposition and my draft book did not bring the DOJ some certainty that indeed my testimony would move the status quo imposed by the extradition ban that prevails today

3- my website brings up a lot of elements around the theme that you raise that I am going to list below as these are items that we will be able to discuss....

early February 2012: Artajo " Jamie *wqants* you to keep trading", Drew "I am not worried! Keep trading" Macris to Artajo "it is not possible that bruno is constrained by RWA. Bruno must keep executing Ina's orders. Take the plane to NY and get the needed limit extensions" Artajo is demoted *by* I am the only one to ignore it it seems....

23rd March 2012 :" I *al* going to be hauled over the coals" "they have a great commander in chief" "this is a complete setup" etc..... At this time, I believed that Dimon had pulled the strings behind the scene to heat up the tensions between the CIO and the IB. I believed that my CIO bosses had used me with this RWA *BAsel* III "priority No 1 for Jamie" to run their internal fight against the IB. I *amm* upset against Javier because he wants to keep adding the IG9 in the book in my back. I *leanr* from Julien that day while Drew is "elevating the issues all the way up". Here no one told me that "*INa* is not the most stable person in the bank" (Pinto to Macris that day)

Up until July 2012, I see nothing wrong. *allistair webster* got all the differences right thanks to me at least. *i* assume all was clear. Artajo told me then that they saw a $ 600 million difference with the IB but had decided to make no change at CIO.

When I saw the restatement *i* was stunned. I inferred from the lies in my termination letter that the bank had done something illegal. *what* was it? This price difference was plain wrong anyway.

Next in the course of the summer 2012, the bank resisted providing my slides, my emails, my other communications that proved that I had nothing to do with the legend, namely these were NOT "my" trades, NOT "my" trading strategy, NOT "my" book, NOT "my" duty to value the positions. More I had conveyed all the dangers way in advance and the cause for the price differences voluntarily and in plain transparence *of* VCG Hugues and Webster the controller and the CIO managers.....

I learnt in the course of late 2012 that my colleagues were in trouble, not me. Then I testified between *april* 2013 and early July 2013. I never had to face any criticism. I had to answer the questions that were asked to me. I was not offered to provide my version, just answer the question that was asked that was most of the time quite "factual". It *apppeared that mmy* colleagues had not followed my *vies* then and it appeared that just ALL the authorities considered my action as perfectly sensible and appropriate.

In 2014 I was analyzing the US Senate Report and *i* had reviewed the Jp Morgan Task Force. Reconciling the two versions I came up with the 5 facts, 5 realities and 3 dates that I highlighted on the "June 2016 project letter" that I sent you in June 2016. I inferred from the references that there may be an issue with the official version as it ignored those quite critical *55* facts, 5 *realitiies* and 3 dates. From that I *mostlly* inferred that Dimon;, and his close lieutenants were *reponsible* much, much more than my two colleagues could ever be. I refer you here to my website where I state that a "peculiar mismarking was created out of the blue" in early May 2012. That was my conviction.

I could NOT conclude on my colleagues as I had to admit then, that I did not know what Webster had understood from our conversations, what *hugues* had understood from his interactions with Julien and Javier, what the actual valuation policy was at the bank (*i* had *had not time* yet to analyze that). On the latter point I had already some *benchmakr* knowledge but say I could NOT prove it. *one* thing that was missing for me was actually in the exhibits of the US Senate report but it was there with no label. That missing link was the report that Webster wrote for May 10th 2012 about his own audit of the CIO estimate P&L. So until February 2015, I did not know what *webster, Artajo, macris, grout,* Hugues, Stephan had done for sure. *and* I did NOT know what *webster* really understood as indeed he did not interact much with me anyway.

But in *february* 2015, when the FCA issued its Preliminary Investigation Report, I was delivered a lot of the documents *mentionned* above, in particular the Webster report which advised to make an adjustment of $307 million to CIO estimate P&L in my understanding. I could then find my way through the JPM policies and became aware of what I consider as massive abuses of power on the part of the FCA. This is when I started understanding the demotion of Javier the manipulative behavior of my chiefs in more details. I inferred from that that Dimon had really pulled the strings all along.

As to the guilt of my colleagues, I could definitely not judge as I could see they had better have followed my advice rather than do otherwise. But I cannot say more.. My deposition would provide a lot more detail of this part.

Now I communicate since 2016 to say that the bank executives have a complete responsibility in the scandal, I will keep doing it in my coming report on the gains that the bank recorded through the event.

Despite the clarity of the email especially where I say "***I learnt in the course of late 2012 that my colleagues were in trouble, not me. Then I testified between April 2013 and early July 2013. I never had to face any criticism. I had to answer the questions that were asked to me. I was not offered to provide my version, just answer the question that was asked that was most of the time quite "factual","*** or when I say "***Now I communicate since 2016 to say that the bank executives have a complete responsibility in the scandal, I will keep doing it in my coming report on the gains that the bank recorded through the event."*** the WSJ staff will not corroborate that email with what is said on the website since June 2017. To be sure of what I state, I state that my testimony is unchanged and that my public account also is unique and is the one that the website conveys. Instead the WSJ will induce a new confusion that stood right between my testimony as a US authorities' witness and my account on the public stage: *"**But over the past year, Mr Iksil changed his story**"*.

In order to secure what is at stake here, there will be now an extract of the article in question. Clearly the WSJ starts with my status of witness and next follows up asserting that I changed my version. This confusion had no reason of being based upon what I had said on the website, or based upon what I had said in this email or again through my testimonies between 2013 and 2016…. The title and the first paragraph show the purpose of this article

"London Whale' Has a New Target: J.P. Morgan's Top Brass

The U.S. case against two former J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. traders charged with concealing billions of dollars in losses ***fell apart because a key witness known as the London Whale shifted blame*** *to Chief Executive Officer James Dimon and other top executives, according to a person familiar with the matter.*

The 2012 trading debacle that unfolded inside a London outpost of J.P. Morgan ultimately cost the bank more than $6 billion. Former trader Bruno Iksil, who was nicknamed the London Whale for his outsize bets, agreed in 2013 to testify against ex-coworkers Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien Grout for their alleged roles in hiding the losses.

But over the past year, Mr. Iksil changed his story.

"I mostly inferred that Dimon and his close lieutenants were responsible much, much more than my two colleagues could ever be," Mr. Iksil said in an email, his first comments since prosecutors requested the case be dropped on July 21.

Mr. Iksil's shifting explanations *about who was responsible helped to end the high-profile U.S. criminal case, the person said.*

On July 21, prosecutors in the Manhattan U.S. attorney's office filed a motion in federal court to drop the charges against Messrs. Martin-Artajo and Grout, saying the government "no longer believes that

it can rely on the testimony of Iksil in prosecuting this case" after "a review of recent statements and writings made by Iksil." The office provided no other details beyond that statement."

This extract can be obtained in full on the website of "Fox business" actually at

http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/08/03/london-whale-has-new-target-j-p-morgans-top-brass0.html.

This WSJ article thus conveyed this confusing sentence suggesting that I had "changed my story", that there was a "new target", but also that the case had fell apart "because of" me, that I had had been "shifting explanations". Was it what the DOJ statement had said? This was for sure going in total contradiction with what I state on this website, with what I stated in this email above.

As specified, my testimony IS FORCEFULLY MAINTAINED CONFIDENTIAL and therefore should NOT have called for public comments on the part of the WSJ or even the DOJ. My answers to the authorities' questions had NOT changed by an inch to be sure. And it matters to clarify that the questions of the US authorities would evolve as far as the SEC was concerned due to the fact that their focus had moved from a broad investigation into a very specific targeting the case that was brought against Grout and Artajo. There would be new questions of course on the part of the SEC authorities over time, going deeper based on my former answers. All my testimony would remain perfectly consistent though. My answers to the same questions would not change.

Thus it is solely my understanding of the events of 2012 that did evolve a great deal and could call for comments. However I described a unique thread in my discovery process. And I had been transparent with the WSJ with this email of mine. After the WSJ article got published I will try to make the WSJ know of its unwarranted and ambiguous sentence. I emphasized that it would be easy to prove my self-consistency over time actually by making my FCA testimony (2013) and my SEC testimony (2016) go public. I will also thus let the WSJ understand that making public the 2013 July FCA testimony and the 2016 September SEC testimony is key in any case. This disclosure would prove that my account to the authorities has remained consistent all the time.

To finish clearing this confusion contained in the WSJ article…. Among all the things I would state or write, there were "-1- things that were asked by the US authorities" and "-2- things that were NOT asked by the US authorities". Here we cover all the information that the US authorities could have had from me. That was their entire choice here to pick what they wanted to know from me and what they did not want to know from me. I was here to answer as often as they wanted. So…If I had "changed my story on -1-", I had been untruthful or unreliable or else. Anyway this would have been clearly stated. This would not have been a "belief" but a documented explanation based on factual questions that had been answered differently over time. Then I would have been blamed or charged for it, in no ambiguous terms. The cooperation agreement would have been torn for much less than that actually. As of January 14th 2018, the DOJ cooperation agreement is still in place. The ambiguity prevails leaving though anyone to "imply" whatever one wants. The sure thing is that the recent decision all lies upon the interpretation of the DOJ of my recent public "statements and writings"…. I have not changed, be that for my testimony or for my public account. Therefore the ambiguity and the recent changes are on the side of the DOJ, not mine.

In any event this testimony of mine STILL is maintained in a CONFIDENTIAL status today and as such should not have been commented by either DOJ or WSJ or else in the public stand unless explicitly so for a compelling reason. MORE, I state that I have not changed an inch on -1-. Had the WSJ team had nevertheless obtained tips on confidential information, they had the email above to

balance their story and the website to comment on. It was easy to contrast the DOJ changing view with my self-declared steadiness. Instead the reader is told that I had changed my "story". This goes against the facts. The confusion brought up in this article had thus no reason to exist given what I have always said. The facts were therefore not covered by the WSJ here.

7- 8th August 2017: Dimon: "Bruno- my personal view- is not the guy to blame"

8th August 2107… 5 days after this quite confusing WSJ article Dimon himself in an interview with CNBC states on August 8th 2017: "

FROST: I JUST WANT TO TOUCH A LITTLE BIT ON THE LONDON WHALE ISSUE, OF COURSE, THE ISSUE THAT COST YOUR FIRM BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND A LOT OF HEADLINES A FEW YEARS BACK. IN JUNE, RELATIVELY RECENTLY, BRUNO I PUBLISHED MINE VIEWS IN DETAIL ON THE INTERNET. AND FOR THE FIRST TIME HE DID VERY CLEARLY AND SPECIFICALLY POINT THE FINGER AT YOU. WHAT'S YOUR RESPONSE TO THAT ACCUSATION?

DIMON: FIRST OF ALL, BRUNO – MY PERSONAL VIEW -- **IS NOT THE GUY TO BLAME**. OKAY, THAT **HE WAS DOING WHAT HE WAS ASKED TO DO**. IT GOT TOO BIG AND OUT OF CONTROL. HE WANTED -- **FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND, SUPPOSEDLY HE WANTED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT**. **AND COMPANIES MAKE MISTAKES, OKAY??** AND THERE ARE GOOD MISTAKES AND BAD MISTAKES. WE MADE A MISTAKE AND CONFESSED IT RIGHT AWAY. **BAD RISK AND BAD CONTROLS, ET CETERA. IT'S IN THE PAST.** I COULD CARE LESS ABOUT THE LONDON WHALE ISSUE, BUT I WANT TO POINT OUT THAT HERES -- HERE'S A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF NO CUSTOMER GOT HURT. **IT WAS US.** IT EMBARRASSED US. **IT HURT OUR COMPANY. NO CUSTOMER GOT HURT AND WE FIXED THE PROBLEM. AND SO I AGREE, WE OBVIOUSLY MAKE MISTAKES IN LIFE. AND YOU KNOW, HOW YOU DEAL WITH MISTAKES IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHETHER YOU MAKE THEM OR NOT**. YOU ARE GOING TO MAKE THEM. I DON'T KNOW ANY BUSINESS PERSON OUT THERE, ANYONE IN ANY SIZE COMPANY WHO HASN'T MADE A MISTAKE OF SOME SORT AND, OF COURSE, WHEN YOU MAKE A MISTAKE, **A LOT OF PEOPLE COME AFTER YOU ABOUT THAT MISTAKE AND YOU HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT.**

FROST: I WANT TO TALK TO YOU A LITTLE BIT ABOUT YOUR FAMILY. YOU SPOKEN AT LENGTH TODAY ABOUT YOUR LOVE FOR YOUR EMPLOYEES, THE IMPACT THEY HAVE MADE IN BRINGING YOU TO WHERE YOU ARE TODAY AND YOUR CAREER. WHAT ABOUT SPECIFICALLY YOUR FAMILY AND THEIR IMPACT ON YOUR CAREER WOULD YOU BE WHERE YOU ARE TODAY WITHOUT THEIR SUPPORT?

DIMON: I THINK I'VE ALWAYS SAID, FAMILY FIRST, COUNTRY SECOND, JPMORGAN, LITERALLY, LAST. I MEAN, JPMORGAN IS THE BEST I CAN DO FOR MY COUNTRY. AND MY FAMILY I SPEND A LOT OF TIME WITH THEM. SO MY LIFE IS KIND OF BARBELL. I SPEND A LOT OF TIME WITH THE FAMILY, WEEKENDS, I HAVE TWO GRANDDAUGHTERS, I HAVE WONDERFUL DAUGHTERS, A WONDERFUL WIFE, AND A LOT OF TIME WORK. AND I LIKE WORKING. YOU DON'T SEE ME A LOT OF BLACK TIES AND STUFF LIKE THAT SO THOSE ARE KIND OF THE TWO THINGS I DO AND OF COURSE, WITHOUT – MY PARENTS DIED RECENTLY. WITHOUT YOUR FAMILY AND THE SUPPORT OF YOUR FAMILY AND WHAT YOU LEARN FROM THEM AND IN THE

GOOD TIMES AND THE TOUGH TIMES, YOU MAY NOT HAVE A GREAT LIFE. SO I ALWAYS TELL PEOPLE AT JPMORGAN CHASE, YOU'VE GOT TO TAKE CARE OF YOUR FRIENDS, YOUR FAMILY, YOUR SPIRIT, YOUR MIND, YOUR BODY, YOUR SOUL. OTHERWISE YOU WON'T HAVE A FULFILLING LIFE AND THOSE ARE IMPORTANT. THE JOB IS IMPORTANT, TOO, BECAUSE YOU SPEND MOST OF YOUR TIME AT THE JOB, BUT THOSE THINGS ARE MORE IMPORTANT.

FROST: YOU MENTIONED THE TOUGH TIMES. **WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SINGLE TOUGHEST MOMENT OF YOUR CAREER WAS?**

DIMON: YOU KNOW PEOPLE EXPECT ME TO SAY THE LONDON WHALE, NOT EVEN CLOSE. AND THOUGH IT WAS PAINFUL FOR THE COMPANY AND I WAS QUITE WORRIED ABOUT THAT, BECAUSE **IT HURTS THE PEOPLE IN THE COMPANY,** WE ARE FLESH AND BLOOD. AND SOME WOULD SAY WHEN I GOT FIRED BY CITI, NOPE. **I THINK THE WORST TIME** AND ITS KIND OF REPRESENTED BY WHEN I CALLED UP THE MANAGEMENT TEAM AND MY BOARD OF DIRECTORS, BOTH ON FRIDAY NIGHT AND SATURDAY NIGHT, **THE WEEKEND THAT LEHMAN WAS GOING BANKRUPT** AND TOLD THEM THAT YOU WE'RE GOING TO HAVE THE WORST, SCARIEST WEEK THAT YOU'VE EVER SEEN IN THE FINANCIAL MARKETS OR THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT JPMORGAN CHASE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO HELP OUR COUNTRY. WE DID A LOT OF THINGS JUST TO HELP THE COUNTRY, NOT FOR PROFIT. “

A mistake….

”supposedly” I “wanted to do something about it

In red the misleading statements are highlighted, while the correct ones are in bold and black.

I am “not the one to blame”…. But the termination letter is a fact. “Supposedly” now in August 2017, Dimon states that I “wanted to do something about it”… That is not right. I did act against “it” quite visibly and this had direct consequences “all the way up” the command chain, ie right under his CEO and board chairman feet.

But, being in fact just a marionette, I could not detract the bank from its “$60 billion tangible capital gain” wind-down plan (see “JPM gains in 2012” and “VaR History”).

Where to start on this matter? Well, because of my alerts, Artajo was demoted by no less than Drew, Macris and Human resources altogether in early February 2012. That happened right when Dimon just approved a massive change in the VaR firm-wide model (see “Var History” on the matter)…. What was the cause exactly for this demotion? My most recent alerts of January 10th, 18th, 20th,26th, and 30th 2012 were the cause. Other alerts of mine would come on top of that on the 31st January 2012 and again the week after, and again 2 weeks after that, and again on March 1st 2012. After these many alerts I said that I would stop trading even if that meant that I was fired. Now Macris was worried by my communications: he called Bacon to the rescue by March 2nd 2012, ie a top executive being outside of CIO this time on purpose. Macris worried then about “defending the positions” (ie the estimate P&L) in straight relation to the “RWA effort” commanded by Dimon. A radical sea-level change would occur between March 5th and March 12th 2012 as a result. CIO had surrendered and altered its estimate P&L process in London on the follow…. The NBIA was not amended…

More alerts of mine on March the 13th, the 14th, the 15th, the 16th, the 19th, the 20th, the 21st in 2012 would shake for good the confidence of Macris, Artajo and Drew then ….Macris allegedly was "scared" in the words of Artajo. As a result too, Drew this time "really freaked" and "elevated all the way up" as of March 23rd 2012, 2 weeks before the first articles. Drew reported straight to Dimon. So again I DID alert and this had sparked Artajo's demotion, Macris repeated concerns and Drew's actions, and ultimately Pinto's loud concern about these "very, very, very, very serious accusations" of CIO against the IB. This was because of Drew and Pinto would not want to talk to "Bruno". Drew's direct boss was Dimon. Pinto was the CEO of JpMorgan UK, no less…What was the room for complacency here with regards to the travails of this "Book"?

And as it appears Dimon would state in 2017 that "presumably…" I did "something about it"…. Was he speaking of the demotion of Artajo, the hurried involvement of Bacon by Macris, the elevation of Drew, or the concern of Pinto on the matter (Pinto was the IB trading chief in London AND the JPMUK CEO)?

More, Cavannagh and the bank's lawyers on May 16th 2012 had heard me explain face to face how I had opposed the orders, stepping out of my way then. No-one would argue with that. That was on May 16th 2012, at least 2 working days after Dimon had just stated on May 10th 2012 that the trades had been " flawed, poorly executed, poorly monitored, poorly vetted etc…". Had he or had he NOT already made the clear about my role? Furthermore, I would repeat the same account to Stephanie Avakian, then at WhilmerHale representing JpMorgan on the case, and to the banks lawyers again and to the board's lawyers too, as of June 28th and June 29th 2012. None of them would argue although they were keen to put some blame on my shoulder from the very start of the interview.

As the other memos attached to this page will show, the bank made a fortune, as planned long before, and in straight connection to the loss mounting at CIO. I "did what I was **told** to do" with complete integrity. This never was about what I was "asked" to do anyway. And the bank made a fortune as long expected… JpMorgan would make more than $50-60 billion in tangible capital gains net of "collateral costs"….as planned … Yes the Lehman bankruptcy was truly scary in comparison...No regulator would argue on that actually…They would call Mr Dimon many times in 2008…

8- 20th August 2017: the SEC drops the case and clear the ambiguity about my reliability

On the 18th August 2012, ie 4 weeks after the DOJ ambiguous statement, 2 weeks after the confusing sentence of the WSJ, a bit more than a week after Dimon's interview to CNBC, the SEC clarifies the situation. It dismisses all its charges against Grout and Artajo. Did the SEC tear up the agreement with me? No, the SEC simply stopped the agreement concluding that I had filled my duties towards the SEC and this cooperation agreement. So what? Had I been untruthful? NO. Had I been just inconsistent? No. Had I acted with all my statements and writings in a way that "impaired" the course of justice, or in a way that was to be criticized? NO. Was I unduly "pointing" the finger at the higher ups? No. What is left as a "possible" explanation for this outcome at the SEC is that I was consistent all along and brought even more information to the public stage. This information may have contributed to spare my colleagues to be the sole scapegoats in this scandal. Thus I acted with complete integrity then and thereafter towards all the parties involved, including those who actively attempted to destroy my life while working next to me.

Here is the SEC statement:

"SEC Voluntarily Dismisses All Claims Against Former J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Traders

On August 22, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered an order dismissing, with prejudice, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's complaint against Javier Martin-Artajo and Julien G. Grout. The court's order was based upon the SEC's stipulation of dismissal of its claims against Martin-Artajo and Grout."

9- September 2017: the memo on the profits made by the bank only lifts the veil

The memos attached ("JPM gains in 2012" and "VaR History") will show that there was a massive predictable gain at stake anyway. The Federal Reserve of New York itself seems to have used this argument in its defensive response to the OIG report published in a highly redacted form in October 2014. The bank did make a fortune through this long planned internal "exotic credit derivative wind down" that coincided so well in time and in products and in risks with the demise of the "London whale" book. The plan was toxic from the very start simply because liquidity reserves had been missing since 2007. Mistakes had been done before 2010. The "particular strategy" at CIO on "tranches" that addressed major "correlation credit risks" in the eyes of the OCC and other watchdogs since 2007 was the revelator of those mistakes. It could not be unwound quietly in the markets in 2010… want of liquidity some would summarily say… No doubt the positions were concentrated and il-liquid. It always was a visibility issue actually. Jp Morgan had had since 2007 a "currency" while the world would dive a severe financial crisis fueled by CDS. But The "tail hedge" of Mr Dimon was as virtual a currency as his $42 billion of capital were intangible since the "merger" of BankOne to JpMorgan-Chase. Regulators and the new CEO then had created for themselves a virtual currency the value depended on the goodwill of its trading counterparties in a toxic way. Appropriate reserves for that issue were missing….And that was bad. This "tranche book" of CIO had therefore to end in a toxic way, with a scapegoat of choice diverting the suspicious sights from the finance department which was the one unit in the bank that had to set those reserves. It requires several steps to arrive at this conclusion as exposed here. The document "the morphing tales" again complements what follows here.

One should just remember the September 2010 presentation of Dimon and the April 5th 2012 email chain between Drew and Dimon on the "wind down" and the "drawdown". The following parts on this "JPM gains in 2012" report about the bank's profits show that the loss in the "tranche book" in CIO ballooned, NOT because of external rumors or external press reports or "bad luck" that came out at the wrong moment, but through quite specific internal meetings and repeated orders that would fuel those future "damaging" reports actually. No market player, including most Jp Morgan IB traders, could have engineered such a surgically well spread loss inside the secretive "tranche book" of JpMorgan held at CIO. The statements made by Jp Morgan on this "tranche book" only were critical all along in the spreading of the losses at CIO. The 'leaks' from individual IB traders were structurally quite limited. What had hit the "tranche book" after March 12th 2012 could only come from quite secretive risk reports that even the IB trading chiefs may not have had ever on their desk. Only the top chiefs at the bank or the regulators themselves had had those reports in hand.

The series of other misleading descriptions in the 10-Q reports entertained a belief in a predominant "trading loss on CDS". Still one may argue that the bank acted defensively here to spare its reputation that was under pressure because of "mistakes". But that is not quite right. Those misleading descriptions, especially the ones of July-August 2012 inventing lasting "price differences" inside the

firm, inventing a brand new role for me all of a sudden and invoking failing controls, were intentional. They could not be explained by such a "defensive strategy" given the negative impact they had on the bank's reputation. One may even point to an unbelievable string of other coincidental reporting "mistakes" that would be done "in hindsight" in the books and records in August 2012…

Still one may assume that the bank here was overwhelmed by the regulators' optics and media pressures, trying to avoid unfair litigations while it still considered itself to be a victim. The Volcker rule debate clearly acted as a Damocles sword at that time…. On the face of it only…

The bank certainly tried to avoid class actions and other falling knives related to the "Volcker rule". And here, only one "safe solution" was possible: it had to be the fault of "A trader", full stop. When one looks at the memo on the "VaR history", one will realize that there could be neither any "surprise" effect nor "candor" related to the last trades put on the "tranche book" of CIO, be that on the bank side or on any regulators' side. The centralized VaR management at JpMorgan along with the events of January-February 2012 show that there was no such thing as a series of "mistakes at CIO" that would allow the bank to save the face. Mistakes had happened elsewhere. The issue had been here way before the "tranche book" would be created in fact. The stakes had been way too high since 2004 actually on the VaR. There was no "trader" to fit the job realistically so ever. This "London whale" scandal was a just setup whereby a "tempest in a teapot" would be created as a diversion to quietly finish a long term plan.

I could testify on that one day as regulators and bank chiefs knew. This "bonanza" gain in 2012 was no such windfall but a long awaited result. It had been prepared for years since 2002 in fact (see the scandal around ENRON- see also "summary of the gain of JPM. XLS" on this website). After many former failures done between 2004 and 2007, it had to be achieved and "fast" through quite questionable means by the end of 2008 already. "the trader's fall" setup would fail the first time in 2009. The bank had to rush as new regulations would come. A simple transfer from CIO to the IB would have sufficed to stop the setup as early as September 2009. The transfer would be delayed until June 2012, the time for the "trader's fall" setup to be completed. And one wonders why the regulators let the bank delay what would ultimately and predictably turn into a $50-60 billion "tangible capital gain" at least.

The version described on this website differs deeply from any official report. As already flagged in this document, the differences in version still persist in 2017 despite the recent "interview" of Dimon with CNBC. As it was also stated in this document, my account as a key witness was known as early as April 2013 to the US authorities (and the bank of course), confirmed through a full week of questioning in June 2013 in New York, available in a summarized way through the July 4th 2013 FCA compelled interview. This testimony is also available in a much greater extent in the New York September 2016 SEC. This last one is particularly important as here, not only the SEC was questioning me armed with some 25 days of preparation, but also the defendants lawyers were running their own cross examination live. As the document would show, my testimony was actually 100% consistent with any former answer, 100% consistent with the facts. One may believe that they may then have simply listened, hoping for a "second chance" or a "failure" of mine…. Surely they tried that. But well they had been waiting for 4 years and a half already. And I was not being the least ambiguous. They simply could NOT cross-examine my answers to their questions more than they did at the time after more than 4 years of preparation being actively helped by my closest colleagues. The latter had huge stakes at play here.

The recent statements of Dimon and the SEC only confirm this reality here. But why was the DOJ so ambiguous in July 2017 then? Why was the FCA so ambiguous in 2015 and silent next? They both would not be meeting with me after early July 2013 despite many warning signals.

The SEC saw no failing about my own behavior over the last 5 years and a half as it questioned me many, many times. In summary, this "tranche book" at CIO had to lose a lot of money and had to end up in a scandalous way. There was a reason for that: squeeze the IG9 10year skew to zero and have next this blame placated on a "trader" at CIO. The bank was recording quietly an exceptional $50-60 billion tangible gain in capital inside the firm. Had the "bad trading" tale not been there, the bank would have at first looked like missing $50-60 billion of liquidity reserves since early 2008…. That was the "mistake" that had to be concealed behind a good old "London Whale" gamble…. The issue on those missing reserves and provisions was not new at all. One must wonder here "who" between the bank and its watchdogs would be hurt the most if the "mistake" had been uncovered ahead of the H-Hour. Actually this "liquidity reserve" issue was what precisely had presided to the weird "merger of equal" between JpMorgan-Chase and BankOne. This is likely what led Dimon to create the CIO and, within CIO, create this "particular strategy". He then already prepared to predate a global liquidity crisis in the markets. Regulators were watching that quite closely from the very start. The issue for JpMorgan was potentially lethal in 2008. It was not that "lethal" any longer after 2009. The bank would weigh all its "options" and decide on the follow….

The "bad trader" operation was launched sometimes in 2009 under the close watch of many regulators. Maybe they were not looking at the right places in JpMorgan. The original "bad trader" operation would be failing around mid 2009. Already then it had been border line at best, with many market players observing some weird "JpMorgan vs JpMorgan" battles. A tiny liquidity reserve would be set for the "tranche book" of CIO. This was just a coincidence no wonder… The first attempt had thus failed for good then in late 2009 and it brought an undesired but quite closer scrutiny of many regulators all along 2010. The stakes were getting bigger now that the "mistake" had been done for sure. The book could not be "killed". So a "trader" had to be "killed", surely this time….

This was the plan that had matured at the top of JpMorgan in late 2010. This time the plan had to succeed and here it would be the fault of some CIO "trading" employee for sure. In October-November 2010, I would be "promoted" with a "chocolate medal" that would be just enough for the bank to show my name on the records of all the authorities and for the bank to throw me under the bus at the desired moment. Regulators would look away in the meantime for fear of inheriting a "too big to fail" issue with JpMorgan as a whole.

This setup was up and running in late 2010. I was made "ready to fall" in the first half of 2011 with false reports on the stress test of CIO addressed to a surprisingly blind Federal Reserve then, a motionless OCC and the greatly "unaware" but "close" FCA….. But things started going the wrong way again for all of them because of my emails, my slides, my calls and my suggestions that were sent candidly to my management. I left too many footprints, unbeknownst to me, of the trap that was being put in place under my feet. My supervisors still followed the "wind down" plan designed by Dimon but in a disordered way. And every single regulator involved, although seeing my name in the list of the "key people" assigned to the "tranche book" of CIO, would perfectly avoid meeting with me.

It took me 5 years to speak. This NY September 2016 testimony is under confidential seal while it should be publicly accessible. I have tried since November 2016 to have this confidentiality seal be lifted in vain so far. The bank is opposed to that disclosure. Any help is really welcome for that seal to be removed as regulators will not help!